Pragmatic theories of truth are usually associated with either C.S. Peirce`s suggestion that true beliefs must be accepted “at the end of the investigation, or William James` suggestion to define truth in terms of utility. More broadly, however, pragmatic theories of truth focus on the connection between truth and epistemic practices, particularly investigative and assertive practices. According to the particular pragmatic theory, true statements may be those that are useful to believe, that are the result of investigations that have withstood continuous scrutiny, that meet a standard of justified applicability, or that represent the norms of assertive discourse. Like other theories of truth (e.g.B. theories of coherence and deflation), pragmatic theories of truth are often advanced as an alternative to correspondence theories of truth. Unlike correspondence theories, which tend to see truth as a static relationship between a truth bearer and a truth maker, pragmatic truth theories tend to view truth as a function of the practices people use and the commitments people make when solving problems. make claims or conduct scientific research. In a broader sense, pragmatic theories tend to emphasize the important role that the concept of truth plays in a number of disciplines and discourses: not only scientific and factual discourse, but also ethical, legal and political discourse. Truth for us is simply a collective term for verification processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. are names for other processes associated with life, and are also pursued because they are worth pursuing.
(1907 [1975: 104]) Think of statements as two and two are four or the torture is false. Assuming that truth is always and everywhere a causal correspondence, it is an annoying question of how these true thoughts can be true. (Lynch 2009:34, emphasis added) Although the technical aspects of Tarski`s work have been much admired and much discussed, its philosophical significance has remained unclear, in part because the T-phrases that many theorists have found unenlightening. But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually changed, and eventually this platiudious appearance was seen as a virtue and, in fact, as an indication of the whole truth about the truth. The idea was that instead of looking at the abstract question “What is truth?”, philosophers should settle for the specific question “What is the truth of S?”; and for each well-specified sentence, a modest T-sentence will provide the answer. One of the current proponents of consensus theory as a useful representation of the term “truth” is the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. [34] Habermas asserts that the truth is what would be agreed in an ideal speech situation. [35] One of the most virulent critics of consensus theory is the philosopher Nicholas Rescher. [36] From the point of view of scientific research, truth refers not only to accepted beliefs, but also to beliefs that are accepted on the basis of a particular method.
For science, truth refers to verified beliefs, statements that have emerged from a certain procedure of examination and testing. By this I mean that if a scientist was asked to give examples of what he meant by truth, he would choose. beliefs that were the result of the best examination technique available in a particular field; and he would, whatever his idea of the nature of the truth. (1911 [2008: 28]) In response, one could point out: (a) definitions such as (1) or (2) are “mini-theories” – mini-theories are quite common in philosophy – and it is not at all obvious that they are empty simply because they are modeled on common usage. (b) There are theories of correspondence that go beyond these definitions. c) The complaint implies that definitions such as (1) and/or (2) are generally accepted and, moreover, are so superficial that they are compatible with any deeper theory of truth. This makes it quite difficult to explain why some thinkers categorically reject all matching formulations. d) The objection implies that the agreement of the condemnation of S with a fact, for example: in the coherence of the conviction with the whole belief system of S. This is completely implausible, even after the most superficial understanding of “correspondence” and “facts.” It is not easy to find a substantial difference between the theory of truth and the different marks of the modified correspondence theory discussed above under the heading “Logical Atomism” (see Section 7.1).
Logical atomists such as Russell (1918) and Wittgenstein (1921) will believe that the truth or falsehood of each bearer of truth value can be (can be derived) by logical relations between truth value bearers, namely by recursive clauses, as well as basic clauses, i.e. the correspondence and non-correspondence of elementary truth value bearers with facts. This recursive strategy could be pursued with the aim of rejecting the principle of truth: not all truths have truth makers, only elementary truths have truth makers (here understood as corresponding atomic facts). But it could also be pursued – and this seems to have been Russell`s intention at the time – in order to guarantee the principle of truth, even if the simple definition of correspondence has been abandoned: all truth does not correspond to a fact, only elementary truths do, but all truth has a creator of truth; by which recursive sentences are intended to show how the search for truth without correspondence, but based on correspondence, occurs. The isomorphism approach has never been advocated in a completely naïve form, assigning objects to every wrinkle of our verbal or mental statements. Instead, proponents seek to isolate the “relevant” components of truth bearers through the analysis of meaning to discover the logical form or deep structure behind ordinary language and thought. .